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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE SCOPE OF THE EPA'S
AUTHORITY AND OTHER ISSUES
BRIAN J. WILLIAMS*

Throughout the course of its 1983-84 term, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided relatively few cases concerning environmental law. Despite the small number of cases, the Seventh
Circuit made key decisions in the areas defining the power of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 1 and the role of federal courts
and federal law in environmental law cases. Specifically, the Seventh
2
Circuit dealt with such issues as the reclassification of attainment areas,
the approval of state implementation plans, 3 the right of the EPA to
enter the premises of a refinery allegedly operating in violation of mandated pollution standards to sample its waste discharge,4 and when the
EPA is required to issue an environmental impact statement. 5 In addition, the Seventh Circuit ruled on the power of federal courts to enforce
state implementation plans approved by the EPA but subsequently invalidated by the state court on procedural grounds 6 and the applicable law
in a nuisance action involving the discharge of pollutants into an inter7
state body of water.

This article will discuss the decisions handed down by the Seventh
Circuit in the above-mentioned areas of environmental law. In addition,
this article will focus on the reasoning employed by the court in reaching
its conclusions, analyze the soundness of the decisions and suggest the
possible ramifications stemming from the resolutions of the cases.
RECLASSIFICATION OF ATTAINMENT AREAS

As amended in 1970, section 109 of the Clean Air Act8 requires the
B.S. in Law Enforcement Administration, Western Illinois University, 1982: J.D. expected
lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1986.
1. Hereinafter referred to as "EPA."
2. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,723 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1983); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v.
Costle, 715 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1983).
3. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984); New York v. EPA, 716
F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983).
4. Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2363 (1984).
5. Simons v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1983).
6. Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 716 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1983).
7. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
8. Hereinafter referred to as "NAAQS."
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EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards, and section 110
requires the states to create and adopt implementation plans for attaining
those standards. 9 To more quickly achieve attainment goals, Congress,
in the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977, added section 107(d) to the
Clean Air Act.' 0 Under this section each state is required to submit to
the EPA a list of areas within the state that have reached the proscribed
attainment levels, areas that have not reached the attainment levels
(nonattainment areas) and areas that cannot be classified either way
based on available information.I' Additionally, section 172 was added to
set more stringent requirements for state implementation plans 12 in
nonattainment areas.'

3

Following the state's submittal of the list, the Administrator of the
EPA is to promulgate each list with such modifications as he deems necessary. Whenever the Administrator proposes a modification, he is to
notify the state and request all available data concerning the region to be
modified. Further, the Administrator is required to allow the state an
opportunity to demonstrate why any proposed modification would be
inappropriate. '

4

In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, ' 5 the Seventh Circuit was called
upon to decide, for the first time, whether the EPA could modify a list
after promulgation to change an air quality control region from unclassifiable status to a nonattainment area. In Bethlehem Steel, the State of
Indiana submitted an original list of air quality regions. The Bums Harbor Works of Bethlehem Steel Corporation was located in a region designated as unclassifiable. The EPA also designated the region as
unclassifiable on its list in 1978. Four and a half years later, the EPA
reclassified the area encompassing the Bums Harbor Works as a nonattainment area.' 6 Bethlehem sought to have the EPA's classification order set aside. '

7

In deciding whether the EPA had the power to revise the list after
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7410 (1978).
10. Id. at § 7407(d) (1978).
11. Id. at § 7407(d)(1) (1978).

12. Hereinafter referred to as "SIP."
13.

42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1978). The purpose of section 172 was to raise the existing air quality

levels. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303, 1305 (7th Cir. 1983).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1978).
15. 723 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1983).
16. Id. at 1305-06. Indiana was required to submit within one year a new SIP to the EPA that
would provide for attainment of federal air quality standards within three and a half years of EPA
approval.
17. Id. at 1306. The EPA argued that Bethlehem had forfeited its right to judicial review of the
order by not timely challenging the EPA's interpretation of the regulation, (40 C.F.R. § 81.300
(1978)), in which the EPA announced it could reclassify areas after the initial promulgation. The
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promulgation, the court looked to the applicable statute.18 The court
analyzed the wording of the statute and found nothing to support the
EPA's argument that the Administrator had the power to revise the list
"whenever" he deemed it necessary. The court further found that the
word "whenever" in the section applied only to the notification
requirement. 19

Having found nothing on the face of the statute to support the
EPA's argument, the court next focused on the legislative intent behind
the statute. The court noted that the bill that became section 107(d) of
the Clean Air Act did not use the word "whenever" and the court had
grave doubts that the committee intended the proposed section to have
''2° Finally, the Seventh Cirthe "dramatic effect that EPA ascribes to it.
cuit added that no procedures for reclassification were set forth other
than in section 107(d) and this section would have been the natural place
2
to empower the EPA to revise the list after promulgation. '
The court continued its analysis by discussing the deadlines set forth
in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. Under section
172(a)(1), 22 compliance with NAAQS was required by December 31,
1982. Thus, when the area encompassing the Burns Harbor Works was
reclassified as a nonattainment area in August, 1982, there were but a few
months left to meet the statutory deadlines. Considering the time allotted for the state to submit to, and gain approval from, the EPA for a new
implementation plan, the court reasoned that it would be unrealistic to
expect compliance with the more stringent standards in such a short time
period. 23 The EPA was also aware of this unrealistic expectation, and,
consequently, it "made up" new deadlines in order for it to gain the desired results. 24 The court concluded that, in doing so, the EPA had gone
25
beyond the scope of the 1977 amendments.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Clean Air Act was
designed to establish a scheme of cooperative state and federal regulacourt responded by noting that there was no sense in Bethlehem challenging a regulation that might
have never done it any harm. 723 F.2d at 1306.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (1978).
19. 723 F.2d at 1306. The court added that the word "whenever" used in this context means
"in any way or every instance which"-a common usage of the word-rather than "at any time."
20. Id. at 1307.
21. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7052(a)(1) (1978).
23. 723 F.2d at 1308.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court found it directly in conflict with the statutory scheme for the EPA to impose
deadlines on the states not provided for in the statute even though the successive amendments to the
Clean Air Act have progressively enlarged the role of the EPA relative to that of the state regulators.
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tion, rather than of purely federal regulation. Pursuant to this scheme of
federalism, the primary responsibility for assuring air quality rests with
26
the state through implementation plans subject to federal review.
Although the EPA argued that the court should defer to the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act, which the EPA enforced, the court disagreed. The court concluded that by allowing the EPA to add to the list
of nonattainment areas whenever it so desired would be to destroy the
balance of state and federal cooperative regulation set forth in the Clean
Air Act. The court stated that it would be "dangerous to automatically
defer to the agency's view."'27 Finally, the court held that the EPA exceeded its power by ordering the reclassification of the area encompassing the Bums Harbor Works. Therefore, the order was vacated. 28 In
short, the court was unwilling to condone the EPA's action when the
action was in stark conflict with the Clean Air Act.
In Bethlehem Steel, the Seventh Circuit made a point much broader
than that the EPA had merely overstepped its bounds. It is clear that a
major goal of the Clean Air Act is to increase the air quality throughout
the nation. In a narrow sense, the Bethlehem Steel decision may have
struck a blow against the goal. Although the case was decided consistently with the wording and intent of the statute, the end result was the
refusal to allow the EPA to reclassify a specific area as a nonattainment
area. In light of the more stringent standards placed upon nonattainment areas, the decision would seem to thwart, at least temporarily, the
goal of increasing air quality.
However, another goal implicit in the Clean Air Act is a federalistic29 scheme of regulation. The decision clearly illustrates the Seventh

Circuit's strong belief in this scheme. The federal court's holding was to
the detriment of a federal agency, but to the benefit of a state. The
court's refusal to permit unwarranted federal dominance over a state activity is consistent with the federalistic spirit of the Constitution and the
Clean Air Act. It is necessary to adhere to this approach, especially
26. Id. at 1308-09 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(a)(3), 7407(a) (1978)).
27. 723 F.2d at 1309. Here, the court noted that it must enforce the balance and not maximize
the position of one side at the expense of the other side.
28. Id. at 1310. However, the court added that the EPA was not helpless to deal with the air

pollution in the area in question. Alternative means of regulation were available. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7410(a)(2)(H), 7410(c)(1)(C) (1978).
29. In the context of this article, the word "federalistic" is used to suggest the notion of the
balancing of power between the federal and state governments. Much of the federal anti-pollution
legislation is federalistic in the sense that the duty of carrying out the legislation is divided between
the federal and state governments. In that respect, much of the anti-pollution legislation is analogous to the federalism form of government in the United States.
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when deviation would place discretion in the hands of a federal agency
which, in this case, was prone to abuse discretion.
A second case which concerned the reclassification of attainment
areas, but which presented the issue in a slightly different context, was
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Costle.30 In 1978, the EPA approved the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resource's 31 list of classifications of
attainment and nonattainment areas. According to the list, Milwaukee
County was designated as an attainment area. However, in 1979, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 32 the WDNR recommended that portions of

Milwaukee, including the portion in which the Wisconsin Electric Power
Company's 33 plant was located, be redesignated as nonattainment. In
addition to the recommendation, WDNR submitted to the EPA documents describing monitored violations of air quality standards. Despite
WEPCO's protests, the EPA signed the final rule of redesignation in
1980. WEPCO timely filed a petition for judicial review. However, the
Seventh Circuit postponed decision on the petition until the EPA acted
on WEPCO's petition to the EPA seeking reconsideration of its rule and
redesignation of the Milwaukee area as an attainment area. In 1982,
WEPCO's petition was denied by the EPA. The EPA's decision was
based on a WDNR modeling analysis of the air quality which predicted
34
numerous violations of air quality standards.
WEPCO appealed the nonattainment designation and the denial of
the petition to change the nonattainment designation. The court declared that it would disturb the EPA decision only if it determined that
the EPA acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority or in an arbi35
trary and capricious fashion.
In arguing against the nonattainment designation, WEPCO alleged
that the EPA illegally based its decision on monitored data reported by
running averages, 36 as opposed to block averages. 37 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit found that the EPA could, consistent with the Clean Air
30. 715 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1983). Douglas M. Costle is a former Administrator of the EPA.
31. Hereinafter referred to as "WDNR."
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2), (5) (1978). According to these sections, a state or the EPA may
institute proceedings to revise a classification list if the need arises.
33. Hereinafter referred to as "WEPCO."
34. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1983).
35. Id.
36. A "running average" is a monitored maximum average of sulfur dixoide concentrations
based on a 24-hour period commencing at any time during the day.
37. A "block average" is a monitored maximum average of sulfur dixoide concentrations measured during a 24-hour period starting at midnight. A block average is less likely thart a running
average to detect air quality standard violations.
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Act, rely on running averages.3 8 The court added that the EPA had expressed the rational reasoning that running averages should be used "because people breathe in SO2 from the ambient air on a continuous basis
'39
rather than in midnight 'blocks'."
WEPCO's second challenge to the nonattainment designation was
that in the time since the EPA had promulgated its ruling, new data had
become available tending to show that the area would qualify as an attainment area. 4° The court refused to accept the argument. Instead it
emphasized that it is a principle of administrative law that WEPCO
could not offer a reviewing court a post hoc basis for disturbing a prior
decision and that the decision must stand or fall on the record before the
EPA at the time when it announced its decision .4a The Seventh Circuit
refused to set aside the EPA's designation based on information that was
42
not available at the time the EPA rendered its decision.
WEPCO further contended that the EPA had improperly denied
WEPCO's petition for redesignation of the nonattainment area.
WEPCO argued that the EPA's decision was both procedurally and substantively improper. 43 The court ruled that the only procedural requirements of the EPA were to give notice of its intention, to allow interested
parties to comment, and to set forth the reasons for its decision." The
court deemed the requirements satisfied. The EPA had sent WEPCO a
letter informing it that the EPA would postpone its ruling on the petition
until it received WDNR's RAM 45 modeling analysis data. Thus, the
court concluded that WEPCO was given adequate notice and that
WEPCO had ample opportunity to comment during the waiting period.
Further, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the EPA had set forth its
reasons for denying the petition when it based its decision on the numerous violations predicted by the RAM modeling analysis. 46 Therefore, the
court concluded that the EPA had met the procedural requirements in
47
denying the petition.
38. 715 F.2d at 326. In reaching this determination, the court relied on PPG Indus. Inc. v.
Costle, 659 F.2d 1239, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
39. 715 F.2d at 326.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 327. The court noted that the proper use of the post-decision data was to petition the
EPA for a redesignation of the area. WEPCO did so, however the petition was denied.
43. Id. at 328.
44. Id. (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 553). The court found that the "set for the reasons" requirement was implicit in the statute's structure.
45. A RAM model is an EPA approved multi-source model for making attainment or nonattainment determinations.
46. 715 F.2d at 327-28.
47. Id. at 329. The court added that "reviewing courts must refrain from creating administra-
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WEPCO's substantive argument was that the EPA should have
based its decision on monitored data tending to show the area as an attainment area rather than the data gathered from the RAM modeling
analysis. However, the court showed that the Clean Air Act is explicit in
authorizing the EPA to base its decisions on either monitored data or air
quality modeling.48 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that the EPA's
policy does not mandate the preference of monitored data over modeling
data. 49 The EPA's policy dictates the use of monitored data over modeling data only if the monitored data is adequate and in conflict with the
modeling results. 50 The court decided that the EPA had reason to believe that monitored data was inadequate considering that the WDNR's
model demonstrated that the monitors did not adequately reflect the air
quality. Additionally, the monitored data was a historical record while
the modeling data was a prediction of future air quality. Consequently
the two sets of data were not in conflict. Therefore, the EPA acted properly in relying on the modeling data.5 ' WEPCO's petitions for review
52

were denied.
As in Bethlehem Steel,5 3 Wisconsin Electric Power 54 presented the

Seventh Circuit with the issue of the federalistic scheme of the Clean Air
Act. In the instant case, the scheme was carried out. The EPA acted
based upon information from the state. Further, the EPA followed the
procedural requirements of the Clean Air Act, which in part serve to
guarantee the federalistic structure by balancing federal and state power.
Although the scheme of the Clean Air Act procedurally balances power,
a court could nevertheless upset the balance by allowing the EPA too
much authority, or by restraining the EPA's authority. In the present
case, if the Seventh Circuit had restrained the EPA, after the EPA had
relied on state supplied information and had followed the mandated procedures, the federalistic balance of power would have been tipped too far
toward total state control.
APPROVAL OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

A second area of environmental law which confronted the Seventh
tive procedures not required by positive law." Id.at 328 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978)).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1978).
49. 715 F.2d at 330 (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462, 467 (6th Cir. 1980)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 330-31.
52. Id. at 331.
53. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1983).
54. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Circuit during its 1983-84 term was the EPA's power to approve SIP's.
As in the area of reclassification of attainment areas, the court was asked
to set boundaries on the EPA's authority.
In Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA,5 5 the court addressed
the question of whether the EPA could disallow an integral part of an
SIP without determining that the part violated the provisions of the
Clean Air Act. In this case, the Indiana Air Pollution Control Board
submitted to the EPA a revised SIP. The SIP included a ceiling on sulfur
dioxide emissions. However, the SIP also contained a provision that a
source would be in compliance if its daily emission did not exceed the
ceiling when averaged over thirty days. The EPA approved the SIP, yet
the agency stated that it was "taking no action on the 30-day averaging
concept."' 56 The company's petition for review challenged the EPA's
order. 57
The Clean Air Act provides that the Administrator of the EPA shall
approve any revised SIP provided it meets the requirements of the Act
and has been adopted by the state. 58 Although the court had previously
held that the Administrator had the power to partially approve a revised
SIP, 59 here it found nothing to suggest that the EPA could approve a
revision in part without first considering the part to be omitted. 6° The
Seventh Circuit declared that the EPA is bound to approve a revised SIP,
limitations and all, if it determines that the SIP meets the requirements
of the Clean Air Act. Consequently, the EPA must evaluate the entire
61
SIP to determine whether the requirements have been met.
Finally, the court concluded that the state is entitled to have its SIP
accepted or rejected based on the merits of the plan, 62 not based on a
regulatory delay. Thus, in failing to make a complete evaluation, the
63
EPA acted beyond its power. The court set aside the EPA's order.
A related issue was presented in New York v. EPA,64 where the court
was asked to determine the extent to which the EPA must consider the
55. 733 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984). The Indiana & Michigan Electric Power Company will be
hereinafter referred to as "Company."
56. 47 Fed. Reg. 10823 (1982).
57. 733 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(A) (1978).
59. Public Serv. Co. v. EPA, 682 F.2d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127
(1983).
60. 733 F.2d at 491.
61. Id. at 492.
62. Id. The court added that ruling otherwise would place a more stringent regulation on the
state than the state desired without first determining that the less stringent regulation was unlawful.
Id.
63. Id.
64. 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983).
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interstate impacts of a revised SIP. In New York, the EPA approved the
revision of an Illinois SIP which allowed the Kincaid Power Station to
increase its sulfur dioxide emissions. The State of New York challenged
EPA did not consider
the approval as invalid based on a theory that the
65
the interstate impact caused by the relaxation.
The court agreed with the State of New York to the extent that
relaxation of emission limits at Kincaid Power Station may have interstate effects upon all NAAQS and that the Clean Air Act requires the
EPA to test by model the effects of the increased emissions. 66 However,
the New York court found that the EPA did make a modeling study of
the effect of the emissions. The study showed that the effects of relaxation on the air quality would be the most drastic in the immediate area
and would decrease sharply and quickly 1.7 kilometers from the Kincaid
Power Station. Based on this information, the EPA concluded it would
be unlikely that the emissions would have a significant impact beyond the
immediate area. Thus, the increase would not prevent the attainment or
maintenance of NAAQS in any downwind state. 67 Accordingly, the New
York court held that the EPA had complied with the requirements of the
Clean Air Act in considering the interstate effects to the limited extent
68
possible given current modeling tools.

The State of New York proceeded to argue that the EPA had a duty
to use the most accurate and reliable modeling techniques available in
making its determination. 69 It further urged that the EPA was required
to utilize a computer based modeling technique suggested by New York,
or, in the alternative, defer any action on the proposed revision until the
70
EPA developed an accurate and reliable model.
The Seventh Circuit ruled that the Clean Air Act did not require the
EPA to adopt any specific modeling technique7 1 and that the EPA chose
the model it used because the model was the most reliable. Therefore,
the court concluded, the state of New York was asking the court to replace the technical judgment of the EPA with the court's judgment. This
65.

Id. at 442.

66. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1978).
67. 716 F.2d at 443.
68. Id. The court emphasized that it could not require the EPA to do the impossible. Accord,
Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982).
69. An in-depth discussion of issues created by modeling techniques is contained in, Case,
Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer Models and Other Methodologies in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 251 (1982-83).
70. 716 F.2d at 444.
71. The EPA in making its decision also relied on information gathered by Commonwealth
Edison using the EPA-approved CRSTER model.
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was clearly beyond the court's authority. 72
The State of New York asserted that the EPA failed to make a prevention of significant deterioration 73 analysis before approving the revision, as required by the Clean Air Act. 74 The court quickly dismissed
this argument. At the time of the EPA's decision, no baseline level of air
quality 75 had been set for Christian County, 76 nor had an application for
a PSD permit been filed. Further, the revision did not require such a
permit. Thus, no calculation of baseline concentration was made.
Therefore, it was impossible to determine whether the revision would
cause impermissible increases of pollution over the baseline level. In addition, the Seventh Circuit declared that the EPA is not required to make
a PSD analysis prior to a permit application which would trigger baseline
calculations. Accordingly, the EPA had no duty to conduct a PSD analysis. 77 The court held that the EPA had complied with the Clean Air
Act. Therefore, New York's petitions for review were denied.
As in the cases concerning the reclassification of attainment areas, it
is clear that in cases concerning the EPA approval of revised SIPs, the
Seventh Circuit is willing to set guidelines on the scope of the EPA's
power. Through careful interpretation of statutes and detailed investigation of EPA actions, the court has allowed the EPA much leeway.
Nonetheless, the court has been quick to restrain the EPA from abusing
its discretion when the result would be unjustly adverse to a state. These
decisions emphasize the Seventh Circuit's commitment to promoting the
federalistic scheme contemplated in the Clean Air Act. The balancing of
power necessary under the scheme is not to balance powerful federal control against weak state control, or vice versa, to reach some sort of middle ground. Conversely, the balancing necessary is to balance the control
and power between a strong federal governing body and a similarly
strong state governing body. Although such balancing may be difficult,
the Seventh Circuit has not shied away from its responsibility to help
clarify the delicate balance.
The holding in New York v. EPA,7 8 that the EPA has the discretion
to use the modeling technique of its choice, is sound in terms of the feder72. 716 F.2d at 444.
73. Hereinafter referred to as "PSD." PSD analysis would indicate whether the relaxation
would cause significant air quality degradation in downwind states.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(J) (1978).
75. Impermissible air quality deterioration is measured by the increase of air pollutant concentrations over the baseline air quality. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7473, 7479(4) (1978).
76. Christian County encompasses the Kincaid Power Station.
77. 716 F.2d at 445.
78. 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983).
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alistic regulatory scheme. However, the decision may inadvertently lead
to stunting the development of more accurate modeling techniques. Obviously, more accurate modeling techniques could indirectly aid in increasing air quality. 79 In all fairness to the Seventh Circuit, however, the
burden of developing more sophisticated, accurate modeling techniques
must fall on the EPA, not the courts.
THE

EPA's POWER TO TAKE SAMPLES FROM
INDUSTRIAL WASTE STREAMS

Once again, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA,80 the Seventh Circuit attempted to help clarify the EPA's scope of authority. However, the question of authority arose in an entirely different context in the Mobil Oil
case. The Mobil Oil Corporation 8 ' operates a petroleum refinery near
the navigable Des Plaines River in Illinois. Pursuant to power delegated
to it by the EPA, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency issued a
permit to Mobil to dump limited amounts of specified pollutants into the
river. The permit required Mobil to monitor the pollutants it dumped
into the river by regularly taking samples from the refinery's waste
streams taken at a point representative of discharge 82 into the river. The
permit further required Mobil to periodically report the test results to
EPA.83
In 1982, engineers from the EPA sought Mobil's permission to collect samples of the treated and untreated water from the waste streams.
Permission was granted concerning the treated waste water but refused
concerning the untreated waste water. Later, the EPA obtained an administrative warrant to collect the untreated samples. Mobil's motions
to quash the warrant, for a permanent injunction prohibiting the EPA
from further exercising the warrant, and requiring the EPA to return the
79. At least one commentator has suggested that federal courts' commitment to federalism in
environmental regulation may be so strong as to lead to adverse effects on the environment. In the
instant case, by allowing the EPA to use its allegedly out-dated modeling techniques the interstate
effects of the increased limits were not considered to the fullest possible extent. Had the court forced
the EPA to use the more advanced modeling system suggested by the State of New York, the possible adverse interstate effects would have been more fully considered. Nonetheless, the choice of
modeling techniques was within the realm of the EPA's power. In the interest of the federalistic
scheme but to the possible detriment of interstate air quality, the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to
infringe upon the EPA's power. A discussion of similar problems created by the federalistic scheme
can be found at, Lutz, Interstate Environmental Law: Federalism Bordering on Neglect?, 13 Sw.
U.L. REv. 571 (1983).
80. 716 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2363 (1984).
81. Hereinafter referred to as "Mobil."
82. Presumably, Mobil treated its waste before dumping it into the river in order to bring the
level of pollutants within the proscribed limits of the permit. For the EPA's purposes, the point
representative of discharge into the river occurs after the treatment.
83. 716 F.2d at 1189.
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previously gathered samples along with the information discerned, were
84
all denied by the lower courts. Mobil appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
On appeal, the EPA argued that it was authorized to test the effluents before and after treatment, while Mobil countered that tests could be
taken after treatments only. The Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA to
enter the premises in which any effluent source is located and to sample
any effluent samples which the operator of that source is required to sample.8 5 Thus, the court found that the EPA had a right to enter the premises, but the issue of the power to collect samples of untreated waste
8 6

water remained.

In deciding this issue, the court looked to Mobil's interest in
preventing the EPA from collecting samples. Mobil had an interest in
preventing the disruption of the daily workings of its refinery. However,
Mobil admitted that the EPA had the right to collect treated samples.
Additionally, the EPA had the power to inspect Mobil's records and
equipment used to combat the flow of pollutants from the refinery. Thus,
the court found it hard to imagine that collecting samples of untreated
effluent could be anymore inconvenient to Mobil than collecting treated
samples. The court added that Mobil's true interest was apparently to
frustrate the EPA in discerning the efficiency of Mobil's treatment
processes.

8 7

Next, the court looked to the goals of the Clean Water Act and the
obligations placed on the EPA by the Act. One of the goals of the Act is
to eliminate the discharge of all water pollutants by 1985. In order to
achieve that goal, the Act authorizes the EPA to police compliance with
permits to pollute. Additionally, the EPA is required to set limits upon
the level of water pollution by a permit holder.88 The Mobil Oil court
noted that the EPA had a legitimate need for information regarding the
efficiency of waste treatment streams.8 9 Therefore, the court concluded
that the most effective means for the EPA to reach the goals of the Clean
Water Act and to meet its obligations and legitimate needs was to take
samples of both the treated and untreated waste water. 90
The court stated that Mobil's interest "in keeping secret information
about the pollutants in its waste water" was not entitled to protection. 9 '
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1977).
716 F.2d at 1189.
Id. at 1190.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1311(b)(2)(A), 1318(a) (1977).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1977).
716 F.2d at 1190.
Id.
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Considering the EPA's legitimate interests in sampling the untreated
waste water, the court accordingly affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.
Consistent with the previously discussed environmental issues confronting the Seventh Circuit, the Mobil Oil case dealt with a gray area of
the EPA's authority. Once again the court allowed the EPA considerable leeway in the absence of an explicit statutory provision to the contrary. Similarly, the EPA was able to articulate several legitimate needs,
as well as statutory obligations, justifying the granting of the implied
power.
The Mobil Oil case presented the balancing of power issue in a
slightly different setting than the previously discussed cases. The Seventh Circuit decided the issue consistently with its other decisions. However, the instant decision was beyond a mere victory for the federalistic
structure of environmental protection. The Bethlehem Steel decision
may have indirectly failed to promote increased air quality by refusing to
allow the EPA to reclassify an area as a nonattainment area, thus, subjecting the area to more stringent pollution standards. In addition, the
New York decision may have been a set-back to the creation of more
accurate modeling techniques which, in the long run, would aid in increasing air quality. In sum, these decisions may have the potential to
indirectly lead to some sacrificing of the quality of the environment. The
sacrifice was made in the name of the federalistic structure of environmental regulation. However, the ultimate resolution of the Mobil Oil
case will lead to no such sacrifice. The decision allows the EPA to go
directly to a source of pollution. If the EPA uses this authority properly,
it can only lead to the reduction of water pollution.
THE

EPA's DISCRETIONARY POWER TO ISSUE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTS

93
In Simons v. Gorsuch,9 2 the court was presented with the issue of
whether the EPA was required, as a matter of law, to issue an Environmental Impact Statement 94 when a sewage treatment plant was constructed with the aid of funds from a federal grant. In Simons, the City

92. 715 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1983).
93. A second issue in the case was whether Simons had the right to notice, through the mail, of
public hearings which were required by local ordinances prior to the issuance of a permit to operate
the sewage treatment plant. Under the local ordinances such notice must be given to all land owners
whose land is within 300 feet of the sewage treatment plant. However, the court found that Simons'
land, by his own admission, was not within the 300 foot perimeters; thus, he was not entitled to such
mailed notice. Id. at 1252.
94. Hereinafter referred to as "EIS". A discussion concerning the problems created by requir-
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of Hayward, Wisconsin, received grants from the EPA to develop and
ultimately construct a sewage treatment plant. Prior to construction, a
WDNR study concluded that the plant would have no significant impact
on the environment and the WDNR forwarded its findings to the EPA.
The EPA evaluated the proposed project and concluded that it would
have no significant impact on the human environment. Simons' suit
seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the construction and operation of the facility was denied by the lower court. No EIS had been
prepared or issued by the EPA. On appeal, Simons argued that an EIS
95
should have been issued as a matter of law.
In order to determine whether an EIS was required, the court ana96
lyzed the applicable section of the National Environmental Policy Act.
The Act requires the EPA to issue an EIS in a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. In defining a
"major federal action" the court looked to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act which deems a federally funded, publicly owned treatment
plant as a "major federal action."' 97 Although the project qualified as a
major federal action, the court reasoned that the EPA still had the discretion to determine whether the major federal action would significantly
affect the quality of the human environment. 98
The EPA had made a prior determination that the project would
not significantly affect the human environment. Hence, the court held
that the EPA was not required as a matter of law to issue an EIS. 99
Consequently, Simons' appeal from the lower court's summary judgment
in favor of the EPA was affirmed.' °°
The Simons case presented yet another context in which the court
was called upon to interpret the EPA's discretionary power. The court
showed a great deal of deference to the EPA. Here, the court's liberal
reading of the statute avoided having stringent restraints placed on the
EPA's discretionary authority.

ing an EIS can be found at Hoffinger, Environmental Impact Statements: Instrumentsfor Environmental Protection or Endless Litigation?, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (1983).
95. 715 F.2d at 1249.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (1975). Hereinafter referred to as "NEPA".

97. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(C) (1974).
98. See 42 U.S.Cc. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (1975).
99. 715 F.2d at 1252. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (1978). The court added that such a requirement
in all federally funded facilities cases, instead of only those cases involving significant effects on the
human environment, would "strip the EPA of substantial discretion." 715 F.2d at 1252.
100. 715 F.2d at 1253.
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THE FEDERAL COURTS' POWER TO ENFORCE A
BY THE STATE COURT

SIP INVALIDATED

Aside from aiding in the determination of the EPA's authority, the
Seventh Circuit determined, in part, the scope of its own authority in
certain aspects of environmental law. Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky
Electric Corp.101 presented the court with the issue of whether a federal
court may enforce a SIP approved by the state and the EPA, but subsequently invalidated by the adopting state on the state law procedural
grounds. In Sierra Club, the Sierra Club brought suit to enforce an Indiana SIP against alleged polluters. However, prior to the suit, but subsequent to the EPA's approval of the SIP, the Indiana Court of Appeals
02
held the SIP invalid on state procedural law grounds.1
The Seventh Circuit found it clear that an administrative action
which failed to comply with proper procedures cannot be given effect.
Further, when the SIP failed to comply with proper procedure, it was as
if the SIP was never submitted to the EPA for approval. 103 Additionally,
the court declared that federal decisions construing the Clean Air Act
encouraged state court review of state procedural plan adoption.,04 The
Sierra Club court stated that "These decisions establish that . . . state
court review of plan adoption is an available, if not a mandatory, means
which certainly is meant to be meaningful" given the state and federal
partnership scheme of the Clean Air Act.10 5 Therefore, rulings of the
0 6
state court must be given effect and the SIP was held invalid.
The Sierra Club's final argument was that the invalid SIP should
remain in force until a substitute plan is devised. The court responded by
noting that it found no support in the Clean Air Act for this argument
and that the appropriate remedy is for the EPA to act. t0 7 The court
bolstered its interpretation of the proper remedy by analyzing the legislative intent of the Act. It found that the legislature intended the federal
101. 716 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1983).
102. Indiana Envtl. Management Bd. v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 181 Ind. App. 570, 393
N.E.2d 213 (1979). The ground was that the state officer presiding over the public hearings failed to
submit written findings to the Indiana Environmental Management Board. Id. at 579, 393 N.E.2d at
222.
103. 716 F.2d at 1148-49.
104. See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980); Ohio Envtl.
Council v. EPA, 593 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1979); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 579 F.2d 846 (4th
Cir. 1978) (suggesting in dicta that failure to pursue a state court challenge may render a party
without standing in a federal court).
105. 716 F.2d at 1151.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1153 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1970)). The court noted that the post-1970
amendments to the Act were not at issue in this case. 716 F.2d at 1146 n.I.
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government to step in and establish a plan for a state when the state
failed to create a satisfactory plan. 0 8 Considering the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of the Act and the legislative history of the Act, the court
held that it was "not free to fashion unprecedented and unusual alternative remedies," and consequently, the court rejected the Sierra Club's
proposed remedy.' 0 9 Having found: (1) that the SIP was invalidated by
a state court on procedural grounds; (2) that the state court ruling must
be given effect; and (3) that the court could not accept Sierra Club's proposed remedy, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that
the SIP was not enforceable.1 10
Sierra Club is an example of the Seventh Circuit rejecting a possible
extension of its own authority in environmental law cases. Had the court
accepted the extension, it would have substantially reduced the power of
the state courts to make meaningful decisions concerning SIPs. In refusing to extend its authority, the Seventh Circuit showed great deference to
the federalistic structure of the Clean Air Act and to the state courts.
The decision is entirely consistent with the federalistic stance that the
Seventh Circuit has taken in the previously discussed cases. The decision
makes it clear that federalism in environmental law cases means not only
the balance of authority between state and federal agencies, but between
state and federal courts as well.
THE APPLICABLE LAW IN NUISANCE ACTIONS

The Seventh Circuit's most significant ruling came in Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee I11 where the court addressed the issue of which law, federal or state, is applicable in a nuisance action based on the discharge of
pollutants into an interstate body of water. The Seventh Circuit had previously addressed this issue in the same case, 1 2 prior to remand, and
held that federal common law was controlling. On appeal, however, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that federal common law in such a
108. 716 F.2d at 1153-54 (citing 116 CONG. REC. H19205 (daily ed. June 10, 1970) (statement of
Rep. Jarman)).
109. 716 F.2d at 1154.
110. Id. at 1154-55. The court acknowledged that the decision may have an adverse effect on
environmental protection due to the fact that no proper SIP would be in force in Indiana at the time.
However, the court expressed a belief that an acceptable SIP would quickly be created.
111. 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984). The case was on remand from the Supreme Court. See supra
note 110. The instant case was actually a consolidation of three cases. Each case involved a faction
or citizen from one state suing a faction of a different state. In each case the nuisance cause of action
arose out of the discharge of pollutants into Lake Michigan. Additionally, in each case the suing
party brought the claim under the nuisance law of that party's state of residence.
112. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The decision was deemed
"important" and "precedential." Harrison, Environmental Law: The Growth and Evolution of
Rights and Liabilities, 56 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 255, 277 (1980).
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nuisance action had been supplanted" 13 by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. 1 14 After considering the effect of the FWPCA on previously recognized causes of action, the Court concluded that Congress
had so completely occupied the field as to supplant federal common law.
Thus, there was "no basis for a federal court to impose more stringent
limitations ... by reference to federal common law."' "1 5 Although the
State of Illinois petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether a
state law remedy was available in addition to the federal statutory rem16
edy, the petition was denied.'
During the present term, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 1' 7 the Seventh Circuit specifically addressed whether state law provides a remedy
in a nuisance action involving the discharge of pollutants into Lake
Michigan. Here, the Seventh Circuit found that the issue of pollution of
interstate waters was a "problem of uniquely federal dimensions" and
concluded that federal law must govern to the extent required by the

FWPCA."18 In a prior ruling on the case, 19 the Supreme Court set forth
several reasons for applying federal common law to issues of interstate
water pollution. First, under the FWPCA, prior to the 1972 amendments, it was clear that federal, not state, law controlled the pollution of
interstate waters. 120 A second rationale was the interstate character of
the parties. 121 Finally, the Court noted that the basic interests of federalism and the federal interest in a uniform rule of decision in interstate
pollution disputes required the application of federal law. 122 Despite this
reasoning, Milwaukee 11 recognized that federal common law had been
113. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 320 (1981) (herinafter referred to as "Milwaukee II").
It has been suggested it was necessary for the federal government to establish national minimum
pollution control standards in order to combat previous state inertia in this area. However, the
extensive federal legislation may have created a preemption problem for states now more desirous of
implementing stricter or different methods of pollution control. Renz, The Effect of FederalLegislation on HistoricalState Powers of PollutionControl: Has CongressMuddied State Waters?, 43 MoNT.
L. REV. 197, 207 (1982). Jeffrey T. Renz was counsel for the State of Illinois in Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
114. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, et seq. (1972) (hereinafter referred to as "FWPCA").
115. 451 U.S. at 320.
116. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 982 (1981).
117. 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984).
118. Id. at 410-11.
119. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as "Milwaukee I").
120. Id. at 102.
121. Id. at 105 n.6. The case involved attempts by one state to regulate municipalities of another
state.
122. Id. at 105. The Court noted that a uniform standard was necessary as a basis for dealing
with "the environmental rights of a state against improper impairment by sources outside of its
domain." Id. at 107 n.9. The decision in Milwaukee I overruled Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals
Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), which held that state law controlled interstate water pollution
controversies.
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displaced by FWPCA.123
In the instant case, the Seventh Circuit recognized that different
states had competing interests in the use124 of the limited resource of
Lake Michigan. Considering that such interests may impinge upon one
another, the use of the lake must be equitably apportioned among the
interests and states, and such apportionment is a "matter of special federal concern."' 25 The court noted that the same reasoning set forth by
the Supreme Court for resorting to the federal common law in Milwaukee 1 126 made inapplicable in the case at bar the use of the law of the
state claiming injury to out-of-state discharges. Therefore, given the
logic of Milwaukee I and the ruling in Milwaukee II, the court held that
federal law was controlling in the present situation except to the extent
that the FWPCA authorized resort to state law. 127
The court proceeded to analyze the FWPCA. It concluded that the
Act contemplated the cooperative exercise of jurisdiction by the state
within which discharges occur. 128 Additionally, Section 1365 of the
FWPCA authorizes a civil action to enforce any effluent standard or limitation; however, the action may be brought only in the judicial district in
which the violating source is located.129 Further, another subsection of
Section 1365 of the FWPCA states that "nothing in this section shall
restrict any right a person or [classes of persons] may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
30
limitation or to seek any other relief."'
Based on its analysis of the FWPCA, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Act did not preclude an injured party from seeking a
remedy other than through federal statutory law. The court concluded
that the injured party could seek a remedy under a state law nuisance
action. However, it added that the state law remedy must be sought
under the law of the state encompassing the alleged violating discharge
source, not the law of the state of the injured party.' 3' Considering that
123. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
124. For example, the discharge of effluents into the lake as part of sewage treatment is one use,
as is use of the lake for drinking water or recreation. 731 F.2d at 410.
125. Id. The court added that to allow one state to impose on another state effluent discharge
limitations more stringent than required by federal law would impair the apportionment of water use
to the latter state.
126. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
127. 731 F.2d at 410-11.

128. See, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) and (c).
129. See, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(1).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
131. 731 F.2d at 414. The court noted that ruling that the state law of the injured party controlled would lead to the grave consequence of a "discharger" having to comply with various common laws of the surrounding states. The court stated: "For a number of different states to have
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the present action was brought by the State of Illinois against the City of
Milwaukee based on Illinois law while the discharge source was located
in Wisconsin, and that this was not an action to enforce any effluent
standard, 132 the court held that the action could not stand. Consequently, the case was reversed and remanded to the district court for
dismissal. 133
The Illinois case presented the court with a relatively simple issue
which became rather complex in light of the Supreme Court's prior rulings. 1 34 Nonetheless, the court made an in-depth investigation into the
prior case law and applicable statutory law. As a result, the court made
a strong, rational decision in the face of the complexities.
Clearly, had the court refused to recognize that a state common law
action may exist, it may have finally put an end to a case that has been in
and out of the federal courts for more than twelve years. However, the
resolution of the case has a potentially deterrent effect on water polluters.
By allowing an injured party access to state law remedies, the polluter
will be confronted with another body of law as a factor to consider in
deciding whether or not to pollute. 1 35 Had the court held that federal
statutory law had preempted all other bodies of law, potential polluters
would be confronted by only one body of law.
If the sole purpose of the ruling had been to deter pollution, the
court could have gone one more step. The court could have held that the
law of the state in which the injury occurred was also applicable. Such a
holding would have subjected polluters to an even greater number of potential penalties. 136 However, consideration other than the deterrent effect on pollution must be taken into account. The decision gives some
independent and plenary regulatory authority over a single discharge would lead to chaotic confrontation between sovereign states." The court added, "[i]t
would be virtually impossible to predict the
standard for a lawful discharge into an interstate body of water." Id.
132. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
133. Id. See also supra note 112 and accompanying text. Considering that the other two cases
presented in this case were based on the law of the state of the injured party, not the state law of the
discharge source, these cases were also remanded for dismissal.
134. For example, the Supreme Court's rulings in Milwaukee I, see supra notes 119-123 and
accompanying text; and Milwaukee II, see supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text; and the
Court's denial of the State of Illinois' petition for a ruling on the issue involved here, see supra note
116 and accompanying text, helped make the issue more complex.
135. It has been argued that although firm federal minimum pollution standards are necessary to
confront modem pollution problems, all protection of public health and welfare cannot be accomplished throught the federal statutory scheme. Therefore, a state should not have its power to protect limited if the state is going to continue to protect its citizens. By allowing injured parties
additional state law remedies, the state's power to protect is not limited as it would be if access to the
state law remedies was precluded by federal preemption. See Renz, supra note 113 at 216.
136. Polluters would be subject to the FWPCA, the law of the state of the discharge source and
the law of the state in which the injury occurred.
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certainty to polluters. By holding that the law of the state of the injury is
inapplicable, a discharger can be more certain as to exactly with which
law and standards it must comply. The decision also strikes a balance
between the competing interests of different states in the use of Lake
Michigan. The laws of each state reflect each state's interests. The decisions allows each state to create law to further its interests without allowing these interests to be subsumed by the laws or interests of a
different state.
A possible problem stemming from the decision arises when considering the balancing of competing state interests rationale in conjunction
with the holding that the law of the state encompassing the discharge
source shall govern. It is feasible that the applicable state law will include some choice of law principles. It is also feasible that these principles may point to the application of the law of a state other than the state
of the discharge source. Were this the case, the interests of the state of
discharge may be impinged upon by the law of the other state. Such a
result would be contrary to the balancing of competing state interests
rationale for the decision in the Illinois case.
A somewhat similar problem presented by the decision is the potential for forum shopping. In recognizing a potential remedy through the
state law of the discharge source, the court granted access to a remedy
beyond relief through the FWPCA. Thus, an injured party may be able
to choose whether to bring suit under the federal statute or under state
law, depending upon which law would grant to the injured party the
most favorable form of relief. Conversely, by rendering inapplicable the
law of states other than the state of the discharge source, the decision
eliminated other possible remedies. The existence of these other possible
remedies may have given rise to more extensive forum shopping. Therefore, the decision may encourage forum shopping in one sense while discouraging it in another sense.
A final problem with the decision is its potential effect on industries
which discharge pollutants into interstate bodies of water. The knowledge that such an industry will be subjected only to the FWPCA and the
law of the state of the discharge location may be a factor the industry
considers in deciding to locate or relocate in a specific state. A state with
stringent effluent discharge limitations may be apt to lose industries to
states with lesser standards. Similarly, a state with lesser standards will
become more attractive as a place to locate or relocate industries.
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CONCLUSION

The majority of the environmental law cases decided by the Seventh
Circuit through the course of the 1983-84 term concerned the scope of
the EPA's authority. While the court allowed the EPA considerable discretion, the Seventh Circuit was quick to restrain the EPA when it attempted to over-reach the bounds of its authority. The decisions were
consistent with the balance between state and federal regulation contemplated by legislation such as the Clean Air Act. At times, the Seventh
Circuit's commitment to this federalism may have been a detriment to
the reduction of pollution. However, the detriments are potential at best.
Further, several of the decisions do have the potential to lead to the reduction of pollution. The decisions reached show a strong deference to
Congress by the Seventh Circuit. The court seems to operate under the
theory that if Congress contemplated a federalistic system of regulation,
that system must be the most appropriate to achieve the desired results.
The court's resolutions reflect a consistent purpose to adhere to the congressional intent. As a result, the Seventh Circuit helped preserve the
state and federal balance proposed by much of the environmental law
legislation.

